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ABSTRACT
Background. This experiment examines two aspects of delusional cognition that have been reported
clinically but not investigated empirically. These are the incorporation of potentially conflicting
information into the recall of delusion-related scripts and the type and amount of material produced
additional to that presented for recall, referred to here as confabulation.
Methods. Three groups of patients – deluded schizophrenics, non-deluded schizophrenics and
matched non-psychiatric controls – were asked to recall two 15-item scripts, which comprised 10
typical and five atypical components. It was hypothesized that deluded subjects whose delusion was
relevant to one of the scripts would recall more of the atypical components of the script and would
also be less likely to make script-atypical confabulations in the recall of this particular script.
Results. Recall was assessed for the amount and type of content remembered and the amount and
type of confabulation. The results did not support the hypothesis that atypical items would be
incorporated into the recall of delusion-relevant material. However, deluded subjects did retain
their schema boundaries in the recall of script items relevant to their own delusion but were less able
to adhere to a script framework in the recall of material unrelated to their delusion.
Conclusions. These results are discussed within a schema specific account of delusions, which
conceptualizes the delusion as an overused schema whose preferential use leads to a failure to
develop other scripts but whose own contents remain well-defined.
INTRODUCTION
Since the publication of Oltmanns & Maher’s
(1988) edited book on delusions, much research
activity has centred on exploring the cognitive
features of delusions. However, two aspects of
delusions, which have received little experimen-
tal attention, are delusional elasticity and the
effect of the delusion on accuracy of memory
recall.
The elasticity of delusions – the ability of the
delusion to stretch to incorporate counterfactual
evidence without altering the essential nature of
the delusion – has been noted by a number of
researchers but not studied experimentally.
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Joseph (1986), for example, describes how
deluded individuals : ‘ rather than relinquishing
an incorrect belief when confronted with con-
tradictory information (…) may make further
erroneous extrapolations or partially incorpor-
ate some aspects of the contradictory infor-
mation within the confabulatory schema’ (p.
508). Similarly, Garety (1992) details a case
study on a deluded individual, Brendan, who
believed that aeroplanes were following him. He
was asked to note down the number of planes he
saw for a week, a figure that would then be
compared to the number of planes observed by
his treatment team. However, Brendan refused
to accept that this would be a true test of the
veracity of his delusion. He argued that should
the totals of planes observed be similar this
would be because the pilots had changed their
flightpaths accordingly. Furthermore, as Garety
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goes on to suggest, ‘an answer of this sort, where
the contradictory evidence is accommodated
within the existing delusional belief and is not
genuinely evaluated, has been found to be
associated with a poor response to therapy’ (p.
284). Consequently, subjects who incorporate
counterfactual evidence into their delusion might
be delusional longer, and have a poorer prog-
nosis. An interesting postscript to Garety’s study
would have been to investigate whether in his
subsequent recall of delusion-related experi-
ences, Brendan had actually incorporated the
disconcordant information. For example, it has
been recorded by researchers such as Kraepelin
(1886–1887: cited in Markova & Berrios, 2000)
that incongruent information when presented to
the subject can become part of their memory of
events and become an integral part of the
delusion.
The accuracy of a deluded person’s recall has
been an issue of some debate. McKenna (1991)
argued that problems in memory were likely
contributors to the formation of delusions.
However, since his argument, assessment of
memory function has mostly been confined to
studies on patients with schizophrenia (but not
necessarily on patients with delusions) and to
levels of memory function rather than accuracy
of recall (see McKenna et al. 2000, for a review).
Where confabulation, ‘ inaccurate or false narra-
tives ’ (Berrios, 2000, p. 348), has been measured,
it has been concluded (Nathaniel-James & Frith,
1996) that schizophrenics do produce substan-
tially more than matched controls when asked
to recall passages of narrative. However, in
addition to the fact that confabulation speci-
fically in deluded subjects has not been assessed,
a further issue needing exploration is the levels
and type of confabulation produced within a
delusional context. This is a particularly interest-
ing issue because of the definitional confusion
that exists between delusions and confabulation
(Berrios, 2000).
A way of combining these two avenues for
research – elasticity and confabulation – is
through a specific memory task based on the
schema plus tag theory (Bower et al. 1979;
Graesser et al. 1979; Smith & Graesser, 1981)
and by using materials that are either related or
unrelated to a person’s delusion. The schema
plus tag theory allows both the elasticity of the
delusion, at least as far as this is apparent in the
recall of atypical items within a delusion-related
script, and the levels of confabulation to be
assessed. According to this theory, atypical and
typical story events, when presented as part of a
script (an organized package of actions for a
specific event), are remembered differently. Aty-
pical actions (i.e. actions that do not routinely
form part of a given script) are tagged separately
in the memory system and do not become
incorporated into the schema (schema and script
are used synonymously in this context). While
the atypical actions are initially remembered
better than schema-typical ones, the script
atypical events become less accessible while the
schema-typical events, because of the long-term
existence and cognitive power of the script,
remain accessible. Specifically, Smith & Graesser
(1981) found that at a retention interval of
1 hour, memory recall was better for atypical
rather than typical events but that after a week
this pattern had reversed. They hypothesize that
this is due to ‘filtering’ in that ‘schemata
selectively filter out ‘‘ irrelevant ’’ (atypical) in-
formation’ (p. 558). The schema plus tag theory
then offers the opportunity to measure deluded
subjects’ recall of delusion-atypical events to
discover the possible propensity for incorporat-
ing disconcordant information into the recall of
delusion-relevant events.
A further area of interest is to identify the
levels and types of confabulation made. For
example, given the script header ‘making a cup
of coffee’ and asked to recall information, mere
familiarity with the script should be sufficient for
a subject to provide script-compatible recall.
However, in this situation one would expect that
if recall was solely based on the accessing of a
script rather than actual recall then several
script-compatible (or script-typical) errors of
recall would be made. If access to that script was
not effective then a number of schema atypical
errors would be made as the appropriate script
had not been activated. Previous research (Chan
et al. 1999) has shown that the scripts of
schizophrenic subjects, in comparison with
matched controls, were less detailed and co-
herent. Consequently, the deluded group may be
more likely to make more confabulations gener-
ally, as their scripts are poorly represented in
their cognitive architecture.
The distinction between atypical and typical
confabulations is also useful when examining
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the types of confabulation made within a
delusional context. A delusion is usually very
well defined so it could be expected that atypical
confabulations in the recall of a delusion-
relevant script would be less likely, solely because
the deluded person has a detailed view of, say,
what finding a piece of surveillance equipment
would entail. Therefore, by using specifically-
designed materials, we can clarify whether
confabulation occurs in the recall of scripts
either irrelevant or relevant to the delusion. It
should be noted that the use of material similar
to the person’s delusion is hypothesized to allow
the re-creation of aspects of delusional cognition
(i.e. cognition within a delusional context), a
claim supported by the fact that different types
of processing have been found in the same
subjects using delusion-relevant and delusion-
irrelevant material (Brennan & Hemsley, 1984;
Rossell et al. 1998).
In this experiment, two script-based sequences
were used. One (the discovery of a phone tap)
was designed to be relevant to at least some
patients with persecutory delusions and a control
story detailed the making a cup of coffee.
Regarding the recall condition, it was hypothe-
sized that in the story in which the content was
similar to the patient’s delusion (in this instance
the phone tap story), the deluded patients would
show a different pattern of recall over the three
time periods compared to deluded patients
without a specific interest in the scenarios.
Specifically, they would recall a greater pro-
portion of atypical material over the three time
periods, which could be seen as a reflection of
their tendency to incorporate disconcordant
material into their delusion. Following Garety’s
suggestion, the amount of atypical recall would
also be associated with the chronicity of the
patient’s delusion. In the confabulation con-
dition, it was hypothesized that patients with
delusions would produce more confabulation
than control groups and particularly more
atypical confabulation. It was also hypothesized
that patients with delusions irrelevant to the
script would be unable to conserve the normal
boundaries of the scripted story in recall and as
well as more typical confabulations (errors in
recall which are within the framework of the
schema) there would also be more atypical
confabulations (errors in recall that do not seem
to fit the general script framework). However, in
the delusion-relevant script it was hypothesized
that subjects would show fewer examples of
confabulation compared to subjects whose de-
lusion was irrelevant to the scenarios.
METHOD
Subjects
Three groups were used in the experiment. The
deluded group comprised 18 deluded subjects
(two females and 16 males) who all had a
diagnosis of DSM-IV (APA, 1994) schizo-
phrenia and were delusional at the time of
testing. Full details of the patients’ delusions
were recorded and subjects were later subdivided
into those with a delusion pertinent to one of the
stories and those without. Consequently, the
study included nine patients for whom sur-
veillance was implicated in their delusion and
nine for whom it was not.
A non-deluded schizophrenic group was also
used to form a psychotic control group and to
test the specificity of the results to delusions as
opposed to the schizophrenic syndrome. Al-
though the importance of this has been noted
(e.g. McKenna, 1997), it has not been widely
achieved. The nine subjects in this group (two
females and seven males) all had a diagnosis of
DSM-IV schizophrenia but were not delusional
at the time of testing or during the previous 3
months. The majority of these subjects (eight
out of nine) had had delusions at an earlier stage
of their illness, which is usual (Taylor et al.
1982).
Ten non-psychiatric controls (three females
and seven male) were recruited. These subjects
had no psychiatric history and were not psy-
chology students or familiar with relevant
research. A number of measures were taken
from all three subject groups. These included the
Beck Depressive Inventory (BDI) (Beck et al.
1961), a test of pre-morbid IQ, the National
Adult Reading Test (NART) (Nelson, 1982), the
Magical Ideation Scale (MIS) (Eckblad &
Chapman, 1983), a digit span test and a test of
current intellectual functioning, the Quick test
(Ammons & Ammons, 1962). Details of age of
onset and length of illness were also noted. All
subjects in the psychiatric groups were on
antipsychotic medication. Mean values for the
demographic and clinical features of the groups
are shown in Table 1.
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Table 1. Mean values for demographic and clinical variables
Group Age (years) Age at onset Length of illness NART Quick BDI MIS Digit span
Deluded (Nfl 18) 29–56 21–29 8–26 25–17 36–67 11–44 13–28 6–44
Non-deluded (Nfl 9) 35–89 25–56 10–33 25–78 38–56 9–78 5–44 6–44
Control (Nfl 10) 31–6 — — 28–2 35–5 4–7 6–3 6–8
There was a borderline significant effect of age
of onset (F (1,25)fl 3–77, Pfl 0–06) in the
psychiatric groups but no overall group differ-
ences in age, length of illness, digit span or on
performance on the NART or Quick tests. As
expected there was a significant difference
between the groups on the BDI (F (2,34)fl 9–6,
Pfl 0–0005) and on the MIS (F (2,34)fl 10–15,
Pfl 0–0004). A second series of analyses was
carried out on the script-relevant and script-
irrelevant subgroups of the deluded group. The
groups were matched on all background vari-
ables except length of illness (script relevant
group meanfl 11–22; script irrelevant meanfl
5–3 years).
Materials
Two scripts were generated (see Appendix 1),
with the principles of script generation taken
from Davidson (1994). One, making a cup of
coffee, was designed to be a general script,
familiar to most of the population. The second,
finding a phone tap, was designed to be more
relevant to subjects with delusions involving
surveillance.
Twelve people were asked to name every
action they could generate for the two script
headers. As a result of this script generation, at
least 10 schema typical sentences for each script
were mentioned by 10 subjects. The 10 sentences
chosen for inclusion in the scripts were men-
tioned by at least 10 subjects. Five schema
atypical sentences were generated by the ex-
perimenter, with criteria for inclusion taken
fromDavidson (1994). Consequently, each script
had 15 basic factual components. In order to
make sure that the atypical events were equally
atypical and the typical events equally typical,
the materials were devised so that there was a
clear difference in the sentences that were typical
and atypical and this was confirmed statistically.
It was also important for the atypicality and
typicality ratings for both scripts to be similar –
so the atypical events of one script were not
more atypical than the atypical ones for the
other script – and this was also statistically
confirmed. Further details on the process of
script validation can be obtained from the
authors.
Procedure
Subjects, having been given the script titles and
asked to listen to the two scripts, were informed
that they would be tested for recall on three
different occasions, – after an interval of one
hour, 24 h and finally 1 week. At each recall,
subjects were given the script title and then
asked to give a verbal account of the story. All
recall was transcribed verbatim.
The verbatim recall accounts were assessed on
whether the recall featured in the story or not. A
score was attained for the number of schema
typical (maximumfl 10) and atypical sentences
(maximumfl 5) that had been recalled. The
other set of data concerned confabulations –
material that was ‘recalled’ by the subjects but
was not actually presented. This material was
described as either schema typical or atypical.
For example, if a subject erroneously recalled in
the making a cup of coffee scenario that a jar of
coffee was taken out of the cupboard, this was
rated as a schema typical confabulation. If,
however, recall contained information about
listening to a radio station and singing along to
the music then this was described as schema
atypical as it is not related to the central theme of
the story – making a cup of coffee. Simple errors
in recall were not included in the data analysis.
The accuracy of the recall was rated by two re-
searchers and yielded an excellent level of agree-
ment (jfl 0–88). The confabulations were also
assessed by the raters. While there was no dis-
agreement between the raters on whether an
item either appeared or not in the original script,
there were three instances where the raters
Elasticity and confabulation in schizophrenic delusions 455
disagreed whether the insertions were schema
typical or atypical. These were then excluded
from the data analysis.
RESULTS
The results for recall have been transformed to
allow the detection of any trends in the
proportion of script typical and atypical sen-
tences recalled over time. As the total number of
schema atypical and typical sentences in each
story differs, the score has been calculated in
probability terms. For example, if a patient
recorded five out of five atypical sentences but
seven out of ten typical sentences this was
recorded in the transformed data as 1 and 0–7.
Recall data
The proportion of the recall of schema typical
and atypical information is shown in Table 2. As
can be seen from Table 2, some expected patterns
emerged such as more typical as opposed to
non-typical information being recalled (F (1,1)
fl 10–55, Pfl 0–003), and an overall response
type‹time interaction (F (2,4)fl 3–74, Pfl
0–03), indicating that schema atypical infor-
mation was remembered less well at the
later testing times. However, a group‹time‹
response type interaction was not significant,
indicating that the deluded group did not recall
more of the atypical events over time. There
were no other interactions or main effects.
It was hypothesized that patients with delu-
sions that were relevant to the phone tap story
would be more likely to remember the atypical
Table 2. Mean probability recall in the two
scripts
Script}Group
Typical recall* Atypical recall*
1 2 3 1 2 3
Phone tap
Deluded (Nfl 18) 0–38 0–37 0–34 0–30 0–25 0–26
Non-deluded (Nfl 9) 0–40 0–38 0–36 0–18 0–18 0–13
Control (Nfl 10) 0–43 0–38 0–29 0–44 0–36 0–22
Making a cup of coffee
Deluded (Nfl 18) 0–27 0–31 0–31 0–52 0–12 0–12
Non-deluded (Nfl 9) 0–32 0–31 0–29 0–27 0–16 0–13
Control (Nfl 10) 0–42 0–38 0–30 0–40 0–20 0–06
* Recall : 1, after 1 h; 2, after 24 h; 3, after 1 week.
Table 3. Mean percentage recall in the two




1 2 3 1 2 3
Phone tap
Relevant (Nfl 9) 0–37 0–38 0–37 0–38 0–33 0–33
Irrelevant (Nfl 9) 0–40 0–36 0–32 0–22 0–18 0–18
Making a cup of coffee
Relevant (Nfl 9) 0–30 0–33 0–28 0–25 0–22 0–16
Irrelevant (Nfl 9) 0–28 0–28 0–29 0–67 0–13 0–13
* Recall : 1, after 1 h; 2, after 24 h; 3, after 1 week.




1 2 3 1 2 3
Phone tap
Deluded (Nfl 18) 0–89 1–10 1–30 0–22 0–11 0–33
Non-deluded (Nfl 9) 0–44 0–56 0–56 0 0–11 0
Control (Nfl 10) 0–60 0–50 0–50 0–10 0 0
Making a cup of coffee
Deluded (Nfl 18) 1–17 0–94 1 1 1–17 1–50
Non-deluded (Nfl 9) 0–78 0–56 0–67 0–11 0 0–11
Control (Nfl 10) 0–90 1–10 1 0 0 0
* Recall : 1, after 1 h; 2, after 24 h; 3, after 1 week.
information as it could be incorporated into
their own delusional schemas. Table 3 shows the
performance for the subdivided deluded group.
As can be seen from Table 3, in the phone tap
story for the script-relevant group, recall of
atypical information is constant, as it is for the
delusion-irrelevant group. In the making a cup
of coffee story, there is, at least initially, a
difference in the amount of atypical information
recalled by the delusion-irrelevant group, how-
ever after time period 1, this effect reduces.
Although there is a borderline effect of time
(F (2)fl 3–26, Pfl 0–052), not surprisingly given
the pattern of results, there were no other signifi-
cant main effects or interactions.
Confabulation data
The other area of interest in this experiment was
the number and pattern of confabulations. Table
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Table 5. Mean number of confabulations for the




1 2 3 1 2 3
Phone tap
Relevant (Nfl 9) 1–00 1–22 1–89 0 0–11 0–11
Irrelevant (Nfl 9) 0–78 1 0–78 0–44 0–11 0–56
Making a cup of coffee
Relevant (Nfl 9) 1–89 1–67 1–44 0–89 1–67 2–56
Irrelevant (Nfl 9) 0–44 0–22 0–56 1–10 0–67 0–44
* Recall : 1, after 1 h; 2, after 24 h; 3, after 1 week.
4 shows the mean number of confabulations per
group. The number of typical confabulations
across scripts in all groups tends to stay constant,
although it appears to be higher for the deluded
group as opposed to the other three. However,
regarding the atypical confabulations, these tend
to be made almost exclusively by the deluded
group. The two stories were combined in a
mixed ANOVA with one between group factor
and three within factors. There was a significant
effect of group (F (2,34)fl 8–99, Pfl 0–0007),
indicating that the three groups differed in their
confabulation levels and post hoc testing reveal-
ed that this was due to the elevated scores in the
deluded group. There was a significant effect of
response type (F (1,2)fl 16–06, Pfl 0–0003), with
more typical as opposed to atypical confabula-
tions recorded. A significant interaction between
story‹response type‹group (F (2,34)fl 5–25,
Pfl 0–01) indicated that the groups made dif-
ferent amounts of either atypical or typical
confabulations depending on the story type,
probably due to the inclusion of script-relevant
material for half the deluded group. No group‹
response type interaction was found.
A final analysis of interest was a comparison
between the performance of the delusion relevant
and delusion irrelevant groups on their con-
fabulation levels. The results are shown in Table
5. It can be seen relatively clearly from the
results that compared to the script-irrelevant
group, the script-relevant group produced fewer
confabulations in the phone tap story (in other
words in the script which had specific relevance
for them) than in the coffee story. This is
confirmed statistically by a significant story‹
delusion type interaction (F (1,16)fl 12–64, Pfl
0–003). There was also a significant story‹
response type‹time‹delusion type interaction
(F (2,32)fl 13–67, Pfl 0–0001), which indicates
the different groups’ tendencies for the atypical
confabulations, particularly in the coffee scen-
ario, to increase or decrease over time.
DISCUSSION
In the recall condition, there was no difference
between the amount or type of information
remembered by the deluded and other groups
generally. For the subdivided deluded group,
the experimental hypothesis suggesting that the
deluded subjects for whom the phone tap story
was relevant would incorporate more of the
atypical information over time was also not
supported, as indicated by the lack of a
story‹delusion type‹response type‹time in-
teraction. Consequently, no correlation analyses
were carried out comparing length of illness with
atypical recall.
Perhaps, on reflection, this result is not
surprising. It could be that the delusional
subjects for whom the scenario was relevant did
not feel the need to incorporate the script-
atypical information into their delusion and
thus cause different patterns of recall. In Garety’s
(1992) example, Brendan had to incorporate
delusion-incongruent information into his delu-
sional schema to safeguard the validity of the
delusion from the threat of falsification. It was
not an automatic process. In this respect, the
experimental design could be seen to be an
inadequate attempt to replicate a feature of
delusional cognition – the incorporation of de-
lusion incongruent information – which occurs
from a much deeper level of processing then
merely being asked to remember facts. This is
clearly an issuewhichwould need to be addressed
in future research.
Regarding the experiment’s second area of
investigation, levels and types of confabulation,
it was found that subjects with delusions
confabulated to a much greater degree than the
non-deluded and non-psychiatric control groups
as indicated by the main effect of group.
Importantly, this is not because of general
problems in recall, as indicated by the lack of a
main effect of group in the recall task. Fur-
thermore, the group‹response type‹story in-
teraction (the story component of the interaction
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is likely to have occurred because of the script-
irrelevant material used for half of the deluded
group) indicates that the deluded group even in
their confabulations did not adhere to normal
schema boundaries. Examine, for example, this
account from deluded patient K. S. at the third
test time in the cup of coffee story.
Sue woke up early one morning and put the kettle on
to make a cup of coffee. She opened the curtains of
the verandah and opened the verandah doors. In
walks her cat. She took the top off the bottle of milk
and poured out the coffee and poured cream into the
cup. She bent down and gave cream to the cat. She
relaxed and had a cup of coffee and the cat enjoyed
his milk.
Although K. S.’s recall makes perfect sense,
it bears little relation to the actual script and is
rich in schema atypical confabulations. Whereas
the whole focus of the actual script targeted for
recall is making a cup of coffee, K. S. has picked
up on one schema atypical aspect of the story
and elaborated around it. He has not conformed
to the normal script framework.
In the subdivided deluded groups, both script-
relevant and script-irrelevant groups showed a
clear difference in the type of story needed to
evoke atypical confabulations. For the script-
relevant group the number of atypical confabu-
lations was very low in the phone tap story – the
story on which they were hypothesized to resist
script-atypical intrusions. However, it is evident
from their performance on the coffee story that
this was not due to a general tendency not to
make atypical confabulations. Perhaps this is
because the delusion itself in some way resembles
a schema. In normal cognition we know that
schemas are relatively well-constructed (Mar-
shall, 1995) and delineated and while not
completely resistant to modification do not
change after exposure to a few counter-examples.
By comparing the delusion to a schema it could
be argued that this explains why atypical events
are not easily subsumed into the delusion and
also how delusion-related recall is protected
from atypical confabulation.
The main result from this study has been that
deluded subjects, as indicated by their con-
fabulation levels, have more difficulties than
controls in recalling accurately scripts unrelated
to their delusions. However, they have a reason-
ably well-defined and established delusional
schema that is able to resist atypical intrusions.
In relating these findings to other theoretical
positions, the first conclusion is similar to the
arguments espoused by Hemsley and colleagues
in explaining schizophrenic symptoms as a
‘weakening of the influences of stored memories
of regularities of previous input on current
perception’ (Hemsley, 1994, p. 97). While
expressed in slightly different language, one of
the obvious correlates of this theoretical pos-
ition, and one confirmed by this study, is that
where recall in deluded subjects is in some way
dependent on script familiarity, this would be
impaired. However, the second part of this
study’s conclusion, that the delusion acts as a
powerful construct in its own right, is similar to
a theoretical position espoused by Magaro
(1980). He argues that the deluded individual’s
cognition is dominated by one or several schemas
(or delusions) that determine or influence the
interpretation of incoming stimuli. Using this
formulation, it is possible to understand why a
delusion would inhibit confabulation in delu-
sion-related recall.
Finally, the relevance of this experiment to
our wider understanding of schizophrenic delu-
sions needs to be discussed. The cognitive
implications of this experiment support the idea
that a delusion can be described as a frequently
accessed and well-developed knowledge struc-
ture. As well as exerting a directing force on
incoming data, the knowledge structure can also
reconfigure events in long-term memory and
influence material available for recall. This
would also suggest that incoming data, which
cannot be interpreted by the dominant delu-
sionary schema may be interpreted without a
theoretical framework and interpretation could
consequently seem random or illogical. This
type of definition is also interesting in that it
avoids philosophical questions concerning the
nature of a delusion as a ‘wrong belief ’ (Berrios,
1991) and posits it as knowledge structure that
engenders conviction through its frequent ac-
tivation (Hasher et al. 1977).
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APPENDIX
The discovery of a phone tap
Patrick went to make a phone call.
He noticed the phone was covered in dust. (Atypical)
He put the receiver to his ear.
He started to dial.
He heard a strange clicking noise.
He scratched his ear. (Atypical)
He unscrewed the handset.
Finding nothing he took apart the console.
He hurt his fingers as he pulled it apart. (Atypical)
He saw a small strange-looking electronic device.
He took it out carefully.
It dropped through his fingers and he had to pick it up
off the floor. (Atypical)
He looked around the house, examining other
electrical appliances.
He peered out of his curtains looking outside his
house.
He noticed his curtains were dirty. (Atypical)
He made a note of the number plate of the van
outside his house.
Making a cup of coffee
Susan put the water in the kettle.
She looked out of the window into her garden.
(Atypical)
She plugged the kettle in.
She got out her usual cup.
It was from her aunt in the Isle of Wight. (Atypical)
She put the coffee in the cup.
She added the boiling water.
She adjusted her glasses. (Atypical)
She took the milk from the fridge and poured some in.
She put in the sugar.
Her cat came in and miaowed. (Atypical)
She took out another teaspoon from her drawer.
Her arm started to itch. (Atypical)
She stirred the coffee.
She took a sip.
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